Using three alternative models that incorporate the behavior of both credit constrained and unconstrained firms in a theoretically consistent manner, this paper presents evidence on the effects of economic liberalization of 1991 on aggregate private investment in India. Two robust conclusions emerge from the estimation of the investment function by ARDL approach. First, the response of private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital has increased at least five times after the dismantling of the 'License Raj'. Second, the evidence implies a significant improvement in the technological efficiency of the firms during the post-liberalization period. In contrast, no robust conclusion can be drawn about the severity of the credit constraint faced by the private sector following the liberalization.
Introduction
Investment and capital accumulation have traditionally been accorded a prime place in the development literature. The evidence from the vast literature on growth empirics shows investment in capital goods as one of the most robust determinants of cross-country growth (see, Levine and Renelt, 1992, Durlauf and Quah, 1999) . 1 Over the last couple of decades, economic liberalization and deregulation policies have been widely adopted by developing countries that assign a central role to the private sector. The emphasis on the private sector as the engine of economic growth and development has brought the focus on the behavior of private investment in developing countries (see, for example, Fielding (1999) on South Africa and Guncavdi, Bleaney and Mckay (1998) on Turkey). After decades of lackluster performance under the all pervasive interventionist policy regime espoused after independence (the so-called 'License Raj'), India embarked on a major economic liberalization program in 1991, triggered by a severe balance of payments crisis. The objective of this paper is to assess the effects of liberalization on aggregate private investment in India. We focus on two related issues: the effects of liberalization on the responsiveness of private investment to changes in relative cost of capital (response in the choice of technique) and on the credit constraint faced by the private sector. 2 A major focus of the liberalization policies in India has been to dismantle the complex web of controls that severely constrained the emergence and operation of the private entrepreneurs. 3 The import competition and competition from FDI unleashed by the external sector liberalization have also increased the pressure on the domestic entrepreneurs. The liberalization measures are thus expected to enable (due to deregulation and decontrol) and induce (due to increased competition) the private entrepreneurs to be more responsive to the price signals both in the output and input markets, and thus help improve efficiency in resource use. A primary objective of this paper is to assess to what extent thisá priori expectation about improved price response is actually borne out by data, focusing on the choice of technique of the firms. While the deregulation and dismantling of License Raj are expected to improve the price responsiveness in general, and in choice of technique in particular, the effects on credit constraint are not unambiguous, oná priori grounds. On the one hand, liberalization might increase the availability of investment funds through higher savings mobilization, foreign capital inflows (both FDI and portfolio), and possibly a reduced demand from the public sector, a tight rein on the domestic credit creation for macroeconomic stability can reduce the availability of credit. Also, a better disciplined and cautious (prudent) financial sector may lead to a hardening of the budget constraints for individual firms (possibly the "sick enterprises") and thus reduce the net credit flow to the private sector (the so-called excess liquidity in the banking sector). From this perspective, liberalization might in fact make the credit constraint faced by the private sector tighter. Liberalization is also likely to spur technological upgrading, due to the competitive pressure and learning and technological externalities from FDIs, for example. Such technological change can be modelled as an autonomous shift in the aggregate investment function, i.e., as a shift in the intercept of the investment function.
Although there is a large literature on the time series estimation of aggregate private investment in developing countries, the empirical modeling has been constrained by the absence of a tractable model of investment under credit constraint. The empirical literature has used different variables to capture the effects of a binding credit constraint, including net credit to private sector both in level and as a share of GDP (for a sample of the variables used, see Rama (1993) ). 4 The theoretical literature on modeling investment behavior under credit constraint has offered two alternative ways of specifying the investment function for empirical estimation. An explicit investment function can be derived, under some restrictions on functional forms, from the closed form solution of a firm's optimization problem (see Chatelain (2000) for a closed form solution).
A more widely utilized empirical specification of the investment function relies on the parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit constraint in the Euler equation for a constrained firm's optimization problem (for a survey, see Hubbard (1998) ). On a priori theoretical and empirical grounds, none of the specifications can be argued to dominate the others, and thus sensitivity of the parameter estimates should be tested using alternative specifications.
In order to ensure robustness of parameter estimates, we estimated the three specifications of the investment function: the first one is derived from the closed form solution (termed as 'Total Cash Flow Specification') and the other two are alternative parameterizations of the Lagrange multiplier. Utilizing the results derived by Chatelain (2000) , a theoretically consistent parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the binding credit constraint is formulated in terms of the first differences of the variables determining the investment of both the constrained and unconstrained firms (termed as 'Chatelain Specification'). A parsimonious parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier in terms of the ratio of total investible funds 5 to real GDP (termed as 'Cash Flow Ratio Specification') is also employed for the empirical estimation. These three specifications of aggregate investment function are used to analyze the effects of economic liberalization on aggregate private investment in India, using time series data for the period 1952-53 to 1998-99.
Apart from a binding credit constraint, the other salient issues for modelling private investment in developing countries include (possible) complementarity between private investment and public capital and the effects of uncertainty on private investment. We implement a model of private investment behavior that incorporates the triple issues of credit constraint, complementarity between public and private investment, and uncertainty. Thus the inference on the effects of liberalization on private investment is likely to be less susceptible to the problems of omitted variables and misspecification of the investment function.
The most interesting result from the econometric analysis based on the ARDL approach (a la Pesaran and Shin, 1999) to the estimation of the investment function is that economic liberalization has dramatically increased the price response of private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital (at least 4.5 times higher in the post-liberalization period). The elasticity of aggregate private investment with respect to the relative cost of capital is estimated to be approximately −1 in the post liberalization period. The post-liberalization period, according to estimates of this paper, has also witnessed a substantial improvement in the technical efficiency of the Indian firms. The estimates based on different specifications of the investment function, 5 Total investible funds equals retained earnings plus change in credit deflated by the price of capital however, lead to conflicting conclusions about the extent of the credit constraint faced by the private sector following the deregulation and liberalization. 6 These main conclusions are extremely robust surviving across different sample periods (1953-99, 1955-99, 1960-99) . The evidence also indicates that uncertainty has a negative influence on aggregate private investment. The stock of public infrastructure (paved road, rail road, electricity generation capacity, and number of telephone connections) seems to have a crowding in effect, but it is not statistically significant.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section presents a discussion of the theoretical and empirical issues in modelling of aggregate private investment function. The next section, arranged in a number of subsections, is devoted to the analysis of the empirical results.
The paper ends with a summary of the empirical findings and their policy implications for India.
Section 1: Modelling Aggregate Private Investment: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
The standard neoclassical model of investment behavior is based on the optimal input choice decision of a profit maximizing firm facing no credit constraint. 7 However, at any given time, in any given economy, a certain proportion of firms will be credit constrained in the sense that the credit available falls short of the amount required for acquiring the optimal capital stock.
The credit constraint may be due to government imposed restrictions (like directed credit that discriminates against certain sectors), or problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the credit markets arising from asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . In a theoretically consistent specification of the aggregate investment, we need to account for the existence of these two types of firms, credit constrained and unconstrained.
An unconstrained firm maximizes profit given the input and output prices, and the production function. Let Q = F (K, L; G) be the production function where Q is output produced, K and L are capital and labor inputs respectively, and G stands for the stock of public infrastructure (henceforth called public capital stock). It is assumed that the production function is concave 6 The results are somewhat different from those found by Guncavdi et. al. (1998) for Turkey, where they do not find any evidence of a change in price response, but find a significant reduction in credit constraint. 7 In strict theoretical sense, the objective is to maximize the present value of the firm. However, the present value maximization is equivalent to profit maximization at each point in time when the appropriate cost of capital is used (see, Sargent, 1987, P.80) .
in the private inputs. The complementarity between public and private capital implies that F KG (.) > 0 and F KGG (.) < 0, i.e., the marginal product of private capital is a positive but declining function of the stock of public capital available in the economy. 8 Denoting the user cost of capital and wage rate by r and w respectively, the implicit form of optimal capital stock function can be written as: 9
In steady state the optimal investment is given by I * = δK * where δ is the depreciation rate.
So the optimal investment function can be written as: 10
where the subscript uc to I * denotes unconstrained firms.
For the firms facing a binding credit constraint the standard price and output variables are not likely to be important in the investment function. Theoretical literature has identified two alternative ways of modeling investment decision under credit constraint for empirical estimation.
First, the investment function of a firm facing binding credit constraint can be derived, given some restrictions on functional forms, from the closed form solution of the firm's optimization problem (Chatelain, 2000) . Alternatively, the investment function of a constrained firm can be specified by parameterizing the Lagrange multiplier associated with the binding credit constraint.
Indeed, parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier has been utilized widely for the estimation of the investment function using firm level panel data (Schiantarelli, 1996 for a survey). However, as noted before, both of the approaches are subject to some caveats. To guard against the sensitivity of parameter estimates and to ensure the robustness of our results regarding the impact 8 The use of public capital as an argument in the production function to study the complementarity between private and public investment was pioneered by Aschauer (1989) . 9 Although it is standard to assume a log-linear functional form, there is no clear justification for it. For a log-linear functional form to be valid, both the production and the demand functions need to be of Cobb-Douglas form. Also note that we are using a relative price variable instead of separate price variables r and w. This is done for two reasons. First, it reduces the number of parameters to be estimated and also minimizes the problem of potential collinearity problem among the price variables. Second, the relative cost of capital seems to be the appropriate variable given our focus on the effects of liberalization on the choice of technique, i.e., the optimal capital-labor ratio.
10 A similar approach is followed by Guncavdi et. al. (1998) .
of liberalization on private investment, we estimate three different specifications of the investment function.
According to the closed form solution of a constrained firm's optimization problem derived in Chatelain (2000) , the investment of a credit constrained firm is a function of the change in credit from the banking sector and a measure of internal funds available to the firm, where both the variables are deflated by the price of capital. 11 The investment function for the credit constrained firm can be written as: 12
where τ is the tax rate, B is credit to the private sector, P k the price of capital goods, the subscripts t, (t−1) denote time periods and subscript c in I * c,t stands for constrained firms. Observe that the first term on the right hand side of the above equation is essentially the retained profit of the firm expressed in units of capital goods. As is clear from equation (3), the right hand side can be collapsed into a single measure of the availability of investment funds from both internal and external sources expressed in units of capital goods which we denote as H t . Although this gives us a theoretically consistent specification for the investment behavior of the credit constrained firms, its empirical application often becomes difficult because of the 'near identity' problem.
The problem of "near identity" arises because the actual investment undertaken by even an unconstrained firm may be, as a matter of accounting identity, equal to the sum of internal and external funds. 13 This implies that when an aggregate measure of investible funds is used in the private investment function, the estimating equation may behave almost like an accounting identity, as the availability of investment funds alone accounts for a large share of the variations in private investment. This may render the other variables of interest like income (aggregate demand) and relative cost of capital statistically insignificant. 11 Observe that even when the change in credit or measures of internal funds have been used in the literature, they are NOT deflated by the price of capital.
12 This is essentially equation (17) in Chatelain (op cit) where both sides of the equation have been multiplied by Ki,t−1. This specification is derived by using first order Taylor series expansion and under the assumption of negligible adjustment costs. 13 The accounting identity relating aggregate private investment and total investible funds of the private sector is, however, not exact due to the fact that some of the credit usually goes to finance working capital, hence it is called "Near Identity".
For the estimation of the parameters of the investment function, different researchers have used different indicators of a firm's financial status to parameterize the Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit constraint. There is a large empirical literature using panel data where the firms are split into separate groups based on some indicator of the likelihood of a firm being credit constrained, for example, cash flow or internal net worth (for a survey, see Hubbard (1998) ). In the literature on time series estimation of private investment functions, especially in the context of developing countries, the net credit to the private sector advanced by the banking sector has widely been used as an indicator of the degree of credit constraint. In the absence of clear theoretical and empirical guidance, some researchers have used the level of credit as an indicator of degree of credit constraint, while others have used the ratio of credit to GDP, or change in credit (see Rama (1993) ). Chatelain (2000) shows that a theoretically consistent parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the binding credit constraint can be formulated in terms of the first differences of the variables determining the level of investment of both the constrained and unconstrained firms. This means that an array of variables including change in retained earnings, second difference of credit to the private sector, change in income, changes in input prices are needed to parameterize the Lagrange multiplier. However, the inclusion of such a large number of variables in the regression often leads to the problems of severe multicollinearity and over-parameterization of the investment function. 14 In order to tackle the multicollinearity problem, we estimated the first principal component (M t ) of the variables suggested by Chatelain (2000) approach to the parameterization of the Lagrange multiplier. 15 The investment function for the credit constrained firm, according to this 'Chatelain' formulation can be specified as:
Note that the investment by a constrained firm is a positive function of the index of finance constraint, M t . The intuition is that the excess demand for credit is a negative function of 
The advantage of this 'Cash Flow Ratio' specification is that it avoids both the near identity and multicollinearity problems and also relates more closely to the available estimates from time series studies which used net private credit as an indicator of credit constraint.
Denoting Ω t as a vector of variables determining the investment by constrained firms and assuming linear specifications for the investment functions of both the constrained and uncon- 16 In the sense of Neary and Roberts (1980) . strained firms, the aggregate investment function can be specified as follows:
where
and λ and (1 − λ) are the proportions of unconstrained and constrained firms in the economy respectively. The variable determining investment by credit constrained firms, Ω t ,is assumed to
The vectorβ andφ in equation (6) denote the (deep) parameters of the aggregate investment function. 17 Note that the treatment of ζ 0 , β and ϕ as parameters constant across the sample period depends on the validity of the implicit assumption that the proportions of constrained and unconstrained firms remain relatively stable over the entire sample period. However, the hypothesis that liberalization might have resulted in a significant relaxation (or tightening) of credit constraint faced by the private entrepreneurs implies that the value of (1 − λ) will be significantly smaller (or higher) in post liberalization period. Such compositional changes are allowed for in the empirical implementation of the model by using appropriate slope and intercept dummies. Also, observe that, strictly interpreted, the model derived in equation (6) allows for changes in price response (with respect to the relative cost of capital r w ) only through a change in the proportion of unconstrained firms in the economy. However, such an interpretation will be too restrictive, especially in the context of India where the main impetus to an improved price response is likely to come from the freedom of investment decisions (in the choice of both input proportions and technology) after the demise of License Raj. This can be modelled as access to an expanded technology set, to be captured by a 17 In the above formulation, the credit constraint is assumed to be binding for a subset of firms in the economy even in the long run. We believe, this is consistent with the experience of developed countries like USA characterized by complete freedom of private entrepreneurial activity and a well developed financial and capital market; there is overwhelming evidence of a subset of firms being credit rationed due to moral hazard and adverse selection (See Hubbard (1998)). change in the production parametersβ, after economic liberalization. 18 As noted earlier, the technological upgrading can also take the form of a shift in the intercept of investment function ζ 0 . However, given the formulation in equation (6), it is, in general, not possible to disentangle the effects of changes in proportions of constrained and unconstrained firms from the effects of a pure technological shift.
Equation (6) gives us the basic specification for aggregate private investment. However, we need to augment the specification to incorporate the implications of uncertainty for private investment behavior. The theoretical analysis of the effects of uncertainty on investment, however, does not yield any unambiguous prediction. On the one hand, the option value of waiting for arrival of new information before committing to irreversible investment implies that the actual investment will be less than the level predicted by simple neoclassical model (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . However, as pointed out by Abel and Eeberley (1996) , there are both a call option (limited liability to expand capital stock) and a put option (limited liability to contract capital stock) involved in the irreversible investment decision, andá priori, the net effect is ambiguous. Since there is no unambiguous theoretical prediction regarding the investment uncertainty relationship, it is ultimately an empirical issue. In the context of developing countries, much recent effort has gone into understanding the effects of uncertainty on private investment (for example, Rodrik (1991), Aizenman and Marion (1993), Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) ). We use black market exchange rate premium as a proxy for uncertainty regarding returns to domestic investment. In the presence of uncertainty about the future stream of income generated by an irreversible investment in the real sector of the domestic economy, foreign exchange holding (which is essentially perfectly reversible) can become an attractive portfolio choice. Thus the demand for foreign exchange in the black market (and hence the black market premium) responds positively to uncertainty about domestic economy (see Van Wijnbergen, 1985 and Rodrik, 1991) . Also, observe that black market premium is a portmanteau statistic for uncertainty about domestic investment covering uncertainties emanating from price and exchange rate fluctuations, from lack of government policy credibility and also from insecurity regarding the claim to property rights due to predation by government or private Mafia.
We use the logarithm of the first principal component of four types of infrastructure (length of paved road, length of rail track, electricity generation capacity, and number of telephone connections) as an index of stock of public infrastructure. 19 Assuming homogeneous specifications for the functions Ψ(M t ) = σM t and Γ(Z t ) = ρZ t , the final specification of the aggregate investment function for three alternative models can be written as follows:
(1)I * t
(2)I * t
(3)I * t
where J t is black market exchange rate premium and D is the dummy for liberalization taking one for the years 1991-1992 to 1998-1999 and zero otherwise, θ = ϕσ, δ = ϕρ and υ t is the error term. In terms of equations (8), (9) and (10), a higher price response after liberalization implies thatβ 2 < 0 and a relaxed credit constraint implies thatφ,θ,δ < 0. Thus equations (8), (9) and (10) form the basis of our empirical analysis.
Section 2: Empirical Analysis
In the empirical analysis we employ ARDL approach due to Pesaran and Shin (1999) for estimation of the long run investment function. An important advantage of ARDL approach to the estimation of a cointegrating vector is that it corrects for endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In the aggregate investment model developed above, the finance constraint variable Z t and H t may be (at least partly) endogeneous given the fact that, for the unconstrained firms, the observed amount of investment funds will be determined by their demand function. 20 The other nice feature of the ARDL approach is that it obviates the need for determining the order 19 Logarithm of index of stock public infrastructure capital is taken to allow for possible non-linearity (decreasing returns) in the relationship between private investment and public capital, as posited in the theoretical model. 20 Of course, if most of the firms are credit constrained, then the potential endogeneity is negligible.
of integration of the individual data series, and thus can avoid the uncertainties involved in the unit root pretesting (see Maddala and Kim, 1998 , for a discussion on the problems associated with unit root pretesting). Also, there is evidence that the ARDL estimator has desirable small sample properties (see, for example, Caporale and Pittis (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999)).
Since the ARDL approach to the estimation of a long run relationship (cointegrating vector) and related bounds tests for the existence of a cointegrating relationship do not require any unit root pre-testing, we start with a brief discussion of the bounds tests (Pesaran, Shin and Smith (8), (9) and (10) using ARDL method for the sample period (1953-99). To save space, we present the results from the ARDL specifications chosen by the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion only. 22 The residuals from the ARDL models selected by the SBC are well behaved. In particular, the results of F test for autocorrelation show that the null of no autocorrelation can not be rejected at 10 percent for all the different specifications. 21 We do not test for the exact number of long run relations, as the ARDL approach (or other single equation methods like FMOLS estimator of Phillips and Hansen and the DOLS estimator of Stock and Watson) gives efficient estimate of a cointegrating vector even when there are multiple long run relations if there are no cross equation restrictions (Caporale and Pittis (1999) . See also Phillips (1991) ). 22 One important advantage of using SBC rather than AIC is that it usually picks up a lower lag order which conserves degrees of freedom. [PLEASE INSERT TABLE (1) HERE] 23 As evident from Table 1 The results reported in table 1 also provide strong evidence in favor of a significant technological shift in the private sector production function after the liberalization of 1991-92. The intercept dummy has a positive coefficient and is statistically highly significant with a P -value of 0.00 across all three specifications of the investment function. As noted in equation (7), a significant upward shift in the intercept dummy can result from a pure technological shift in the production function or from an increase in the number of unconstrained firms or from a combination of both. None of the specifications estimated in table 1 allow us to isolate the extent of shift in intercept term due to the technological upgrading from that due to a change in the number of unconstrained firms, but they help to determine the direction of these shifts. We notice in table 1 that the estimates from the Chatelain specification imply an increase in the number of constrained firms during the post liberalization period. Even in this specification, the intercept dummy has a positive coefficient though its magnitude is smaller compared with the estimates from other two specifications. Note also that the intercept dummy is also statistically highly significant [t-value= 4.58]. Thus one can safely argue that the evidence clearly indicates a positive shift in the private sector production function in the post liberalization period. This finding is consistent with the available evidence from micro studies using firm level data which reported significant improvement in technological efficiency of the firms during the post liberalization period (see, for example, Forbes, 2001 ).
Estimation of the Long Run Investment Function
As to the other determinants of aggregate private investment, all three specifications tell a consistent story. The level of GDP has a numerically large and statistically significant positive effect on private investment suggesting a strong accelerator mechanism at work. Uncertainty as captured by black market exchange rate premium has a negative effect across all three specifications. The coefficient of the index of public infrastructure capital has a consistent positive sign across all specifications indicating possible complementarity with private investment. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant even at 10 percent.
As a further test of the robustness of our results, we estimated all three specifications of the investment function for three different sample periods (1953- 99 reported in table 1 Since the user cost of capital incorporates the effects of the price of capital along with the interest rate, this also implies that a rise in the price of capital, for example, due to a large devaluation of rupee, can have significant adverse effect on aggregate investment in India. 26 The negative effect of uncertainty as represented by black market exchange rate premium is, however, not large in magnitude; a one percent increase in the black market exchange premium lowers private investment only by 0.07 percent, even if one uses the highest estimate. This muted effect of uncertainty is not totally unexpected, as the effect is not unambiguous oná priori grounds also. 27 We take a cautious approach to the estimates of elasticities with respect to other policy relevant variables presented in table 3 either because, contrary to the widely held prior expectation, the variable in question has statistically insignificant impact (e.g. public infrastructure) or the sign of the coefficient changes across specifications (e.g. credit constraint).
Thus it would be premature to draw any firm conclusions about the extent of their effects on private investment in India without further research. 25 The results of Rolling Regressions and Recursive Estimation for each individual coefficient in all three models are available from the authors. 26 An increase in the price of capital will have especially depressing effect on the current investment if the price of capital is expected to come down subsequently. This is so because in this case the expectation of a capital loss reinforces the disincentive created by the higher current price of capital. 27 The black market exchange premium also captures, at least in part, the effects of international trade distortions on domestic private investment. The evidence thus shows that there is a negative, albeit small, effect of trade distortions on aggregate private investment in India.
[PLEASE INSERT 
Conclusions
Using three alternative models of aggregate private investment that incorporate the behavior of both credit constrained and unconstrained firms in a theoretically consistent manner, this The negative effect of uncertainty as measured by the black market exchange rate premium, however, seems to be numerically small, although statistically significant. While the estimates imply a complementary relationship between the stock of public infrastructure capital and private investment in India, the relationship is rather tenuous and statistically insignificant. Estimates from different theoretically consistent specifications of the investment function provide conflicting evidence on the severity of credit constraint during pre-and post-liberalization periods. Thus no robust conclusion can be drawn about the impact of liberalization on the extent of credit constraint faced by the firms. Our empirical analysis thus shows that the conclusion about the extent of credit constraint may be sensitive to the specification of the investment model and highlights the pitfalls in relying on any given specification. The results bring into focus the need for robustness checks using alternative theoretically consistent specifications of private investment under credit constraint. H(t)=(Retained earnings (t) +Change in credit (t)) / Price of Capital (t).
Z= H (t) / Q (t).
M=first principal component of of first differences in total investible fund (retained earning plus change in credit both deflated by price of capital), inverse of change in real GDP, change Note: a: Cash flow ratio is equal to the ratio of total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in credit, both deflated by the price of capital) to real GDP. b: Chatelain specification:1 st Principal component of first differences in total investible fund (retained earning plus change in credit both deflated by price of capital), inverse of change in real GDP, change in relative cost of capital, inverse of change in public infrastructure and change in black market exchange premia. c: Cash flow is equal to total investible fund (retained earnings plus change in credit, both deflated by the price of capital). 
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